Adherence to the Code: Justice Antonin Scalia’s Italian American Jurisprudence by Spizzuco, Michael A.
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2015
Adherence to the Code: Justice Antonin Scalia’s
Italian American Jurisprudence
Michael A. Spizzuco
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Spizzuco, Michael A., "Adherence to the Code: Justice Antonin Scalia’s Italian American Jurisprudence" (2015). Law School Student
Scholarship. 793.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/793
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adherence to the Code: Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
Italian American Jurisprudence 
By: Michael Spizzuco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia is arguably the most controversial Justice on the 
United States Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia is known for his scathing dissents and origina list 
views.  This paper analyzes Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence and asserts that a motivating factor in 
Justice Scalia’s decision-making is his Italian-American heritage.  Part I of this paper offers a 
biography of Justice Scalia.  Part II introduces the theory of this paper and Justice Scalia’s 
jurisprudential approach.  Finally, Part III summarizes ten (10) Supreme Court Opinions authored 
by Justice Scalia and explains how his decision in each opinion relates to his Italian-American 
heritage. 
I. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION 
Antonin Gregory Scalia was born in Trenton, New Jersey, on March 11, 1936. 1  Justice 
Scalia was born to Salvatore Eugene Scalia, a Sicilian immigrant who eventually became a 
professor of romance languages at Brooklyn College, and Catherine Scalia, an elementary school 
teacher. 2  When Justice Scalia was six years old, his family moved from Trenton to Elmhurst, 
Queens. 3 Upon completion of middle school, Justice Scalia was awarded a scholarship to attend 
the prestigious Xavier High School in Manhattan.  After graduating first in his class at Xavier 4, 
Justice Scalia attended Georgetown University for his undergraduate studies.  Justice Scalia 
graduated from Georgetown as class valedictorian and summa cum laude with a degree in History 
in 1957. 5  For his graduate studies, Justice Scalia attended Harvard Law School and graduated 
magna cum laude in 1960, while also attaining the Sheldon Fellowship of Harvard University. 6  
                                                 
1 Molotski, Irwin, "The Supreme Court: Man in the News; Judge with tenacity and charm: Antonin Scalia", The New 
York Times, (June 18, 1986), retrieved August 23, 2014. 
2 Biskupic, Joan, American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia , Sarah 
Crichton Books, pp. 11-15. (2009). 
3 Biskupic pp. 17-19. 
4 Marcus, Ruth, "Scalia tenacious after staking out a position", The Washington Post, (June 22, 1986), retrieved August 
23, 2014. 
5 Molotski (1986). 
6Fox, John, Biographies of the Robes: Antonin Gregory Scalia , pbs.org, retrieved August 23, 2014.  
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From 1961 through 1967, Justice Scalia served as an associate for the firm Jones, Day, 
Cockle and Reavis in Cleveland, Ohio. 7  Justice Scalia soon moved his family to Charlottesville, 
Virginia where he spent four years as a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. 8  After 
four years teaching at the University of Virginia, President Richard Nixon appointed Justice Scalia 
as the general counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy.  From 1972 until 1974, Justice 
Scalia served as the chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States. 9  Halfway 
through 1974, President Nixon nominated Justice Scalia as an Assistant Attorney General for the 
Office of Legal Counsel. 10  Justice Scalia taught at University of Chicago Law School from 1977 
continuing through 1982. 11  He did, however, spend one year as a visiting professor at Stanford 
Law School. 12 
In early 1982, Justice Scalia was offered a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit in Chicago.  However, Justice Scalia turned the position down, hoping instead 
to be appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  In mid-
1982, Justice Scalia got his wish when President Ronald Reagan appointed him to the D.C. Circuit.  
13  While serving on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia’s scathing opinions caught the attention of the 
Reagan administration officials. 14  In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated his intent to retire.  
President Reagan nominated Associate Justice William Rehnquist to be the Chief Justice, however, 
                                                 
7 Scalia Speaks in Ames, Scolds Aggressive Student , Harvard Law Record, December 7, 2006, retrieved August 23, 
2014. 
8 Biskupic (2009), pp. 37-38 
9 Fox. 
10 Fox. 
11 Shipp, E. R., "Scalia's Midwestern colleagues cite his love of debate, poker, and piano", The New York Times, (July 
26, 1986), retrieved August 23, 2014. 
12 Staab, James, The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on the Supreme Court , Rowman & 
Littlefield, (2006). 
13 Biskupic (2009), pp.80. 
14 Taylor, Stuart, "Scalia's views, stylishly expressed, line up with Reagan's", The New York Times, (June 19, 1986), 
retrieved August 23, 2014.  
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that left a position as Associate Justice open. 15  President Reagan nominated Judge Scalia 16 and 
the Senate unanimously confirmed him on September 17, 1986, allowing Justice Scalia to become 
the first Italian-American Supreme Court Justice. 17   
There has been some controversy of Justice Scalia’s confirmation, however.  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee overseeing Justice Scalia’s confirmation had just finished affirming Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s nomination, which proved challenging.  According to witnesses and 
Democratic Senators, Justice Rehnquist has engaged in activities designed to discourage minorit ies 
from voting. 18   Further, the Senate Judiciary Committee had learned that the proposed Chief 
Justice wrote a legal memorandum for Justice Robert H. Jackson on the landmark Brown v. Board 
of Education 19 case.  The memo read: “I realize it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, 
for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson 20 was right 
and should be reaffirmed.” 21  Of course, a plain meaning of this memorandum would offer the 
conclusion that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not support integration of public school systems.  
Accordingly, the Committee members did not wish to battle over a second nomination and were 
reluctant to oppose the first Italian-American nominee. 22   
II. JUDICIAL APPROACH 
Justice Scalia is a self-described originalist, meaning that he interprets provisions of the 
United States Constitution as it would have been understood when the provision was put into 
                                                 
15 Biskipic (2009), pp. 104-109. 
16 Biskipic (2009), pp. 104-109. 
17  Dautrich, Kenneth; Yalof, Alistair Yalof. American government: historical, popular, and global perspectives. 
Cengage Learning. p. 241. (2009). 
18 Biskupic (2009), pp. 100, 109–110. 
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
21 Liptak, Adam. New Look at an Old Memo Casts More Doubt on Rehnquist .  The New York Times, published March 
19, 2012.  Retrieved November 25, 2014. 
22 Biskupic 2009, pp. 100, 109–110. 
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effect.  According to the Justice himself, “It’s what did the words mean to the people who ratified 
the Bill of Rights or who ratified the Constitution.” 23  This, therefore, means that Justice Scalia 
believes Amendments to the Constitution are also to be interpreted based upon their meaning at 
the time the Amendment was passed. 24    Further, Justice Scalia opposes other scholars who 
speculate about the intent of the drafters and the view that the Supreme Court must interpret the 
language of the Constitution figuratively. 25  Moreover, Justice Scalia is vehemently opposed to 
the concept of a living constitution, meaning, the power of the judiciary to modify the 
interpretation and meaning of constitutional provisions to adapt to the changing ideals of society.  
26  Similar to his views on constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia is a textualist regarding 
statutory interpretation.  This school of thought believes that the ordinary and plain reading of the 
statute should govern its application and meaning.  In interpreting statutes, Justice Scalia refuses 
to reference or take into consideration the legislative history behind said statutes.27  This approach 
and Justice Scalia’s decisions are due, in part, to his Italian-American heritage. 
In Italian-American culture, family is incredibly important. 28  According to Thomas and 
Mary Shaffer, “It was the family, not the individual, that moved from the highly protective enclave 
of the old way (la via vecchia) to concern (campanilismo) for place of origin (paese) and for the 
extended family that eventually resulted from this broader community of concern (paesani).” 29  
                                                 
23 Justice Scalia on the record, cbs.com, August 24, 2008, archived from the original on January 4, 2010, retrieved 
August 23, 2010. 
24 Greenhouse, Linda, "Washington talk: High Court still groping to define due process" , The New York Times, (May 
31, 1990), retrieved August 23, 2014. 
25 Scalia, "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules," 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 
26 Greenhouse (1990). 
27 Rossum, Ralph, The textualist jurisprudence of Justice Scalia , Claremont McKenna College, archived from the 
original on January 25, 2010, retrieved August 23, 2014. 
28 D'Andrea, The Social Role Identity of Italian American Women: An Analysis and Comparison of Familial and 
Religious Expectations, in THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS 61 (R.N. Juliani 
ed. 1983) 
29 Thomas L. Shaffer Mary, Character and Community: Rispetto As A Virtue in the Tradition of Italian -American 
Lawyers, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 838, 843 (1989) 
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Further, the Shaffer’s determined that this shift was possibly due to the concept of rispetto.  
Rispetto is the way to “acknowledge publicly one’s position…and thereby to incur a set of 
obligations.” 30  Incurring obligations, though, is a position that is within and from the family, 
thereby creating obligations for the family.  However, modern Italian-Americans have shifted their 
focus from primarily on the family, to the immediate community and finally through the 
contributions of a group to the host culture.  Specific characteristics that support this notion 
include: 
(1) a sense of place (paese), an inheritance from the generation of immigrants who 
expanded the protection of the family to include fellow villagers (paesani); 
 
(2) independence, the desire and skill to act on one's own “and in the event of a real 
need for help [to go] to one's family”'; 
 
(3) courage — seggendo in piume in fama non si vien ne sotto coltre (fame does 
not come to one who lies on feathers under a blanket); 
 
(4) self-respect—fare bella figura—which necessarily includes respect in and for 
the family; and 
 
(5) respect for the place of the outsider, when one is in the outsider's place, so that 
one does not flaunt one's own ways in the presence of strangers. 31 
 
 Equally as important as family to Italian-American culture, is a penchant for a strict set of 
rules to be followed, leading to a strong sense of cohesiveness in the family structure. 32  Structure 
in Italian-American families is largely authoritarian; freedom for the children is not encouraged or 
                                                 
30 Id. at 844, citing Notarianni & Raspa, The Italian Community of Helper, Utah: Its Historic and Folkloric Past and 
Present, in THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS, supra note 23 at 31. 
31 Id. at 845, citing Viscusi, Il Caso della Casa: Stories of Houses in Italian America , in THE FAMILY AND 
COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS, supra note 23 at 115-116 
32 Peter A. Lauricella, Chi Lascia La Via Vecchia Per La Nuova Sa Quel Che Perde E Non Sa Quel Che Trova: The 
Italian-American Experience and Its Influence on the Judicial Philosophies of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Joseph 
Bellacosa, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1701, 1706 (1997) 
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permitted by the parents. 33  This resulted in strict discipline and a delayed independence from 
family. 34  Accordingly: 
…there were rules Italian-American children were to follow, no questions asked, 
which gave them a strong sense of right and wrong. This rule-oriented upbringing 
led Italian-American scholar John Horace Mariano to conclude that two resultant 
characteristics of Italian-Americans are “[s] traightforwardness and honest dealing” 
and “[s]ubmission to the majesty of the law.” 35  
The “rules” mentioned above aren’t necessarily the law of the United States; there has long been 
a history of organized crime within Italian-American culture.  However, the “mafia” has their own 
code: Omerta.  Omerta is the code of silence that all Mafioso undertake. 36  Specifically, omerta 
refers to the “categorical prohibition of cooperation with state authorities or reliance on its services, 
even when one has been a victim of a crime.” 37  Further, according to omerta, Mafioso should 
avoid interfering in the business of others and should not inform the authorities of a crime under 
any circumstances.  The mafia follows this code uniformly; deviation is punishable by death. 38  
Although the mafia’s rules (omerta) are not legal by any means, the Italian-American mafia still 
follows their code or set of rules, much like all Italian-Americans.  The code is strict and deviation 
is not acceptable. 
This paper seeks to establish that Justice Scalia’s originalist and textualist beliefs are a 
result of his Italian-American upbringing.  Two main theories permeate through Justice Scalia’s 
decision-making and opinion writing; the strong sense of family and a strict sense of obedience to 
                                                 
33 Id. at 1707, citing Andrew Rolle, The Italian-Americans: Troubled Roots (1980) at 114. 
34 Id., citing Colleen Leahy Johnson, Growing Up and Growing Old in Italian-American Families (1985) at 183 
35 Id., citing John Horace Mariano, The Italian Contribution to American Democracy 239 (1975) 
36 Cutrera, Antonio La mafia e i mafiosi, Reber, Palermo: 1900, p. 27 (reprinted by Arnaldo Forni Editore, Sala 
Bolognese 1984, quoted in Nelli, The Business of Crime, p. 13-14. 
37 Paoli, Letizia, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style (Studies in Crime and Public Policy) . Oxford 
University Press, New York. 2003. 
38 Id. 
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a set of rules or code. 39  The section that follows analyzes ten (10) of Justice Scalia’s opinions 40 
and proffers a theory on how Justice Scalia’s Italian-American heritage and upbringing influenced 
each decision. 
III. CASE STUDIES 
 A. Roper v. Simmons 41 
 The Defendant, Christopher Simmons, plotted a murder with two young men when he was 
seventeen (17) years old.  One of the individuals eventually backed out of the plan.  Nonetheless, 
Simmons and an accomplice broke into the victim’s home by reaching though an open window 
and unlocking the door.  When the victim awakened and wandered into the hallway, Simmons 
immediately recognized her from a previous car accident involving the both of them.  The 
perpetrators bound the victim with electrical wire and wrapped her entire face in duct tape.  From 
there, the perpetrators forced her into a vehicle, drove her to a state park 42 and threw her off a 
bridge, drowning the victim. 
 When the case was brought to trial, the evidence to convict Simmons was overwhelming.  
Not only had Simmons confessed to the police, but he also performed a video reenactment of the 
crime.  Additionally, there was testimony from Simmons’ accomplice that implied that the murder 
was premeditated.  After trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for Simmons 43 and recommended 
a death sentence, which was accepted by the court.  Immediately, Simmons appealed the case, 
initially arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 44 since his trial attorney did not 
                                                 
39 A host of sub-factors related to the main theories opined above include: A sense of place or comfort in one’s place, 
courage, self-respect, respect for others, a limitation on freedoms, and straightforwardness. 
40 A blend of majority, concurring and dissenting opinions. 
41 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
42 Id. at 556.  
43 Id. at 557  
44 Id. at 558 
 10 
raise his age, impulsiveness and troubled background as potential mitigating factors.  The trial 
court rejected Simmons’ motion, which Simmons appealed. 
 As Simmons appealed his sentence, the Supreme Court ruled on Atkins v. Virginia 45 , 
holding that the mentally retarded could not be executed.  Simmons thereafter filed a new petition 
for post conviction relief and the Supreme Court of Missouri followed Atkins 46 and Simmons was 
then sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 47   The State of Missouri appealed the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s decision to the United States Supreme Court. 
 In writing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, began his analysis by examining a number of cases decided 
in the past determining the validity of capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen (18).48   
In 1988, the Court decided Thompson v. Oklahoma 49, which barred the execution of crimina l 
offenders under the age of sixteen (16). 50  Further, in 1989, the Court upheld capital punishment 
for offenders sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years old when they committed capital offenses. 51  
However, in 2005, using the “evolving standards of decency” test, the Court held that it was cruel 
and unusual punishment to execute an offender who was under the age of eighteen (18) at the time 
of the murder.  The majority cited numerous sociological and scientific studies that concluded 
juveniles have a lack a maturity and responsibility compared to their adult counterparts. 52  Further, 
                                                 
45 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
46 Id. at 559 . 
47 Atkins overturned the death penalty for the mentally retarted.  According to the Supreme  Court of Missouri, “a 
national consensus has developed against the execution of the mentally ill” and as such, the execution of the mentally 
ill was deemed to violate the Eighth Amendment.  Taking this decision into consideration, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri sentenced Simmons to life imprisonment, as opposed to death.  While Simmons was not mentally retarted, 
the court may have compared the capability of understanding crime at his age to those that are mentally retarted.   See 
Katcsh, M. Ethan, Taking Sides.  Clashing Views on Legal Issues (13th Ed.), Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 
p. 247 (2008). 
48 Id. at 560  
49 487 U.S. 815 (1988).  
50 Id. at 561  
51 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
52 542 U.S. at 564-569 
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teenagers were found to be the most overrepresented group in many categories of reckless 
behavior.  The Court also acknowledged that almost every state prohibited those under eighteen 
(18) from serving on juries, voting, or marrying without parental consent. 53 
 The Court also noted that there was an increasing frequency in which states were choosing 
not to execute juvenile offenders.  At that time, twenty (20) states had the legal authority to execute 
juvenile offenders.  However, only six (6) states had actually executed juveniles since 1989 and 
only three (3) of those doing so in the previous ten (10) years.  Moreover, five (5) of the states 
which allowed the child death penalty in 1989 had since abolished it.  The Court also looked to 
contemporary practice in the international community.  Between 1990 and the time of the decision, 
only seven (7) countries other than the United States has executed juvenile offenders.  Those 
countries included Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and China.  The majority further noted that since 1990, each and every one of those 
countries had either abolished the practice of executing juvenile offenders or had made a public 
disavowal of the practice.  Finally, the Court noted that only the United States and Somalia had 
not ratified Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
expressly prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles. 54  Ultimately, the Court 
held that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the execution of 
individuals under the age of eighteen (18). 55 
 In concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, pointed out that the most 
important part of the decision was the reaffirmation of the basic principle of interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 56  According to Justice Stevens, “If the 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 570-578  
55 Id. at 579 
56 Id. at 587. 
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meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would impose no 
impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today.” 57 
 Justice O’Connor dissented, criticizing the Missouri Supreme Court for failing to follow 
the precedent established by Stanford.  While Justice O’Connor agreed that the evidence presented 
in the immediate matter was similar to the evidence in Atkins, she contended that at least eight (8) 
states adopted legislation that permitted the execution of sixteen (16) and seventeen (17) year-old 
offenders. 58  Further, Justice O’Connor argued that the difference in maturity between adults and 
juveniles was not significant enough to justify excluding juveniles from the death penalty. 59 
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in this case.  The over-arching theme of Justice 
Scalia’s dissent was that the appropriate question was not whether there was a national consensus 
against the execution of juveniles; rather, whether the execution of the defendants was considered 
cruel and unusual at the time at which the Bill of Rights was ratified.  In addition, Justice Scalia 
also objected to the Court comparing American law to international norms.  Justice Scalia took 
particular issue with the Court’s willingness to “invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own 
thinking, and ignore it otherwise.”  This statement was made in respect to abortion laws in the 
United States being less restrictive than the rest of the world and the Court’s reliance on English 
law, which did not possess the same double jeopardy law the United States had.  Further, Justice 
Scalia felt the majority was acting outside of the Supreme Court’s designated power, in that, the 
Supreme Court was essentially interpreting the law of what it should say rather than what the law 
actually says. 60 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 597-599. 
59 Id. at 598-607. 
60 Id. at 607-630  
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 In this case, Justice Scalia’s Italian-American heritage permeates his criticism of the 
Supreme Court usurping the legislature’s power in determining what the law should say, rather 
than viewing and interpreting what the law actually says.  In this way, Justice Scalia is adhering to 
a strict set of rules rampant in Italian-American culture.  Justice Scalia specifically noted the line 
of the Court’s power and how they crossed into another branch of government’s power, i.e., 
breaking the separation of powers “rule.”  Further, Justice Scalia chastised the majority for not 
taking into consideration that the Missouri Supreme Court flatly ignored the Court’s precedent set 
forth in Stanford. 61  Justice Scalia, in this point, states his disdain for the Missouri Supreme Court 
for going against the Court as Justice Scalia points out "it is this Court's prerogative alone to 
overrule one of its precedents." 62  This frustration can be attributed to Justice Scalia’s desire for a 
strict following of rules. 
 In this opinion, Justice Scalia seems to have no sympathy for those who commit heinous 
offenses, even when under the age of eighteen (18).  Justice Scalia’s wish to rely on precedent over 
the empirical data the majority cited not only demonstrates his need for a strict set of rules; it also 
may demonstrate that Justice Scalia fits within the mold of Italian-Americans demanding a strong 
sense of right and wrong from children.  While the majority cites data and international precedent 
in an effort to “protect” the minor, Justice Scalia finds the data (and the minor’s age) irrelevant.  
Finally, Justice Scalia’s disgust with the majority’s reliance on international law/custom could be 
attributed to the emphasis on independence formed in Italian-Americans.   
 B. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 63 
                                                 
61 Id.  at 628-629 
62 Id. at 629, citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (2001) 
63 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
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 In this case, the petitioner and several other teenagers made a cross out of broken chair legs 
and tape.  Once the cross was assembled, the youths placed the cross in the front yard of an African-
American family and set it on fire.  The petitioner was charged with a violation of the St. Paul 
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which provided: 
Whoever places on public or private property, a symbol, object, appellation, 
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi 
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm 
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits 
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 64 
 
The petitioner argued that the statute was facially invalid under the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and moved to dismiss the count on the ground that it was substantia l ly 
overbroad and impermissibly content based.   The trial court granted the motion, however, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minnesota Court had construed the phrase 
“arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others” 65 to conduct that amounted to fighting words under 
the Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire 66 case.  Furthermore, the Minnesota Court concluded that the 
ordinance was not impermissible because "the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means towards 
accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-
motivated threats to public safety and order." 67   The petitioner sought certiorari, which the 
Supreme Court granted. 
                                                 
64 Id. at 379 
65 Id. at 380 
66 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  This opinion held: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those, which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been 
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly  
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 
67 In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) 
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 In writing the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice 
Souter and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia noted that petitioner’s conduct could have been 
prosecuted under a variety of Minnesota statutes. 68  Justice Scalia also stated that the Supreme 
Court was bound by the conclusion that the ordinance at issue only reached expressions of 
“fighting words” under Chaplinsky. 69   The petitioner contended that the Chaplinsky standard 
should be narrowed; therefore the ordinance would be invalid as substantially overbroad.  
However, the Court concluded that even if the offense amounted to “fighting words” under 
Chaplinsky, the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face in that it prohibited permitted speech 
solely on the basis of the subject the speech addressed.  The Court reached this conclusion after a 
careful and thought-provoking analysis. 70 
 First, the Court began its analysis with a review of free speech principles, beginning with 
the rule that the First Amendment prevents the government from proscribing speech because of 
the ideas expressed. 71   However, the Court noted that in a limited number of circumstances, 
society has permitted restrictions on the content of speech when there is “…such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.” 72  The Court then clarified previous free speech cases, stating that 
some areas of free speech:  
…can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their 
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) — not that they 
are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be 
made the vehicles for content discrimination. 73 
 
                                                 
68 505 U.S. at 379-380, N.1 
69 Id. at 380 
70 Id. at 381  
71 Id. at 382  
72 Id. at 382-383, citing Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572 
73 Id. at 383-384 
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Therefore, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, the government could "proscribe libel, but it may not make 
the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government." 74 
Further, Justice Scalia explained that while an utterance of speech may be allowable on the 
basis of one feature, the Constitution could very well prohibit it on the basis of another feature.  
For example, burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishab le, 
but burning a flag in violation of an ordinance dishonoring that flag is not. 75 Additionally, other 
reasonable time or place restrictions could be upheld, but only if those restrictions were “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” 76 
The Court then analyzed two final principles of free speech.  One describes that when "the 
entire basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of 
speech is proscribable, no significant danger of viewpoint discrimination exists." 77  The other 
principle involves a valid basis for according treatment to certain sub-classes of speech if that 
speech "happens to be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that 'the 
regulation is justified without reference to the content of the … speech.'" 78  For example, the Court 
noted that a State may permit obscene performances except those involving minors. 79  In applying 
the principles to the city ordinance at issue, the Court found that it was unconstitutional on its face.  
80 
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor, opined that the Supreme 
Court of Minnesota’s judgment should have been reversed since the ordinance criminalized 
                                                 
74 Id. at 384 
75 Id. at 385  
76 Id. at 386, citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)  
77 Id. at 388  
78 Id. at 389, quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)  
79 Id. at 389  
80 Id. at 391  
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expression protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution. 81  By reaching that expressive 
conduct that causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment is criminal, Justice White concluded that 
the ordinance was overbroad. 82  Further, Justice White determined that the First Amendment does 
not protect “fighting words” along with other particular categories of speech. 83  Finally, Justice 
White concluded that if the ordinance had not been overbroad, it would have been valid as a 
regulation of unprotected speech for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection 
clause.  84 
Justice Blackmun concurred in judgment, however, Justice Blackmun concluded that the 
majority’s approach would result in two consequences: (1) the decision would relax the level of 
strict scrutiny applicable to content-based laws or (2) the decision would be regarded as a 
manipulation of the First Amendment to strike down an ordinance whose premise the majority 
opposed. 85 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White and Justice Blackmun, opined that the ordinance 
was overbroad. 86  However, Justice Stevens determined that the majority was incorrect in ruling 
that proscribable speech cannot be regulated based on subject matter. 87  Further, Justice Stevens 
criticized the majority for giving “fighting words” and obscenities the same protection afforded to 
political speech. 88  Finally, Justice Stevens concluded that not all content-based distinctions are 
uniform and presumptively invalid. 89  
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In this case, Justice Scalia’s Italian-American characteristics are not in the forefront of the 
opinion as in the previous case.  However, the two characteristics that could have contributed to 
Justice Scalia’s decision in this matter are a limitation on freedoms and respect for others 
property/family.  In the first point of analysis, Justice Scalia acknowledged a limited number of 
circumstances where an individual’s right to freedom of speech can be limited. 90   This is an 
obvious nod to a willingness to restrict freedom.  In the Court’s second point of analysis, Justice 
Scalia stated that the Constitution can limit and permit freedom of speech on a similar subject. 91  
In his final points of analysis, Justice Scalia touches on the respect for others factor.  Specifica lly, 
Justice Scalia noted that when subclasses of speech have a secondary effect, the regulation could 
be justified. 92  In this case, the sensitive nature of the facts could certainly be considered under 
this analysis. 
C. Lee v. Weisman 93 
In this case, Petitioner Robert E. Lee, the principal of a middle school in Providence, Rhode 
Island, invited a Jewish rabbi to lead a prayer at the school’s graduation ceremony. 94  The parents 
of a student, Deborah Weisman, requested an injunction to bar the rabbi from speaking at the 
ceremony.  The school district denied the family’s request. 95  After the graduation ceremony, the 
family proceeded with litigation and won in the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  The school district, 
on behalf of Lee, filed a writ of certiorari United States Supreme Court. 96  The school district 
argued that the prayer was non-denominational and was voluntary, as Deborah did not have to 
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stand during the prayer.  Further, the school board argued that Deborah and Deborah’s family did 
not have to attend the ceremony at all.  97 
The majority found in favor of the family in a 5-4 decision.  Justice Kennedy, joined by 
Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Souter, authored the majority 
opinion, which found that Lee’s decision to give the rabbi the forum to conduct a public prayer for 
a civic occasion was wrongful: 
Through these means, the principal directed and controlled the content of the 
prayers…It is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
that it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any 
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on 
by government, and that is what the school officials attempted to do. 98 
 
Further, the majority noted that the non-denominational nature of the prayer was not a valid 
defense, since the Establishment Clause forbids coerced prayers in public school.  The coerced 
prayer does not have to be of one religious sect to be prohibited. 99   Moreover, the majority 
dismissed the notion that the graduation ceremony was voluntary as extreme, since graduation is 
one of life’s most significant occasions and absence of the ceremony would “require forfeiture of 
those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high schoo l 
years.” 100  In answering the school district’s contention that the prayer itself was voluntary, Justice 
Kennedy formulated the coercion test, holding: 
The school district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony 
places subtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending students to stand as 
a group or maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. A 
reasonable dissenter of high school age could believe that standing or remaining 
silent signified her own participation in, or approval of, the group exercise, rather 
than her respect for it. And the State may not place the student dissenter in the 
dilemma of participating or protesting. Since adolescents are often susceptible to 
peer pressure, especially in matters of social convention, the State may no more use 
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social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use direct means. The 
embarrassment and intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing 
that the prayers are of a de minimis character, since that is an affront to the rabbi 
and those for whom the prayers have meaning, and since any intrusion was both 
real and a violation of the objectors' rights. 101 
 
Justice Kennedy further stated that the Constitution of the United States guarantees that the 
government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or 
otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”  
102 
 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, concurred with the 
majority’s holding.  Justice Blackmun concluded that the Establishment of Religion Clause 
prohibits government endorsement of religion and the government’s active involvement in 
religion. 103  Justice Blackmun found this conclusion despite the fact that government coercion is 
sufficient to prove a violation of the clause. 104 
 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, expressed that the cause 
bars a state from endorsing generically Theistic prayers when the state could not sponsor 
denominational prayers in his concurrence. 105  Moreover, government sponsorship of prayer at 
graduation ceremonies is reasonably understood as an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.  
In this case specifically, the government endorsement rose to support of Theistic religion. 106   
Finally, Justice Souter opined that a showing of coercion is not necessary to a successful claim of 
a violation of the Establishment of Religion Clause. 107 
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In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued against the adoption 
of the coercion test.  Justice Scalia believed that the majority’s holding “lays waste a tradition that 
is as old as public school graduation themselves, and that is a component of an even more 
longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally. ”  
108   Scalia pointed to historical examples of calling on divine guidance by former Presidents, 
including President Washington’s proclamation of Thanksgiving in 1789. 109   Further, Scalia 
disputed the Court’s holding that attendance at graduation ceremonies were required as social 
norms and the conclusion that students were subtly coerced to stand for the prayer.  In his view, 
only “official” penalties for refusing to support a religion resulted in an Establishment Clause 
violation. 110 
 The main indicator of Justice Scalia’s Italian-American heritage in this case is his 
adherence to a strict set of rules.  Specifically, Justice Scalia mentions that only “offic ial” penalties 
violated the Establishment Clause. 111  In that sense, Justice Scalia essentially states that only an 
explicit refusal to support a religion arises to a Constitutional violation. 112  Further, Justice Scalia 
refused to acknowledge that the school had implicit control over the attendance of the high school 
graduation. 113   In this way, Justice Scalia also followed his strict code, as he only would 
acknowledge an explicit control over attendance as opposed to implicit control. 
 D. Edwards v. Aguillard 114 
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 In the early 1980’s, numerous states attempted to introduce the teaching of creationism 115 
along with the teaching of evolution in schools.  Louisiana instituted a law that did not require 
teaching of creationism or evolution; but the law did require that if evolution was taught, 
creationism must be taught as well. 116  The District Court ruled against Louisiana, with the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the decision.  Both courts found that the motive in passing the 
statute was to promote creationism. 117 
 The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, Justice 
Blackmun, Justice Powell and Justice Stevens, ruled the law unconstitutional as an infringement 
on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The majority’s basis for this conclusion was 
an analysis under the Lemon 118 test, which is comprised of three steps: (1) The government’s 
action must have a legitimate secular purpose, (2) the government’s action must not have the 
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) the government’s action must not 
result in an “excessive entanglement” of the government and religion. 119  Based upon this premise, 
the majority held the law facially invalid since it lacked a clear, secular purpose. 120  The Court 
found that the law did not further its stated purpose of “protecting academic freedom” and the law 
impermissibly endorsed religion by advancing creationism. Further, the law gave teachers no 
freedom they did not already possess and limited their ability to decide what academic princip les 
should be taught.121 
 Justice Powell, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred, concluding that the language of the 
statute and the statute’s history confirmed the intent of the Louisiana legislature to promote a 
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specific religious belief. 122  Further, Justice Powell wrote that the nothing in the majority opinion 
limited the broad discretion state and local school officials traditionally enjoyed, regarding the 
selection of public school curriculum. 123  In conclusion, Justice Powell held that under a challenge 
of the Establishment Clause, interference with the decisions of school boards is only warranted 
when the intended purpose behind a decision is obviously religious. 124 
 Justice White also concurred with judgment of the majority.  In his opinion, Justice White 
wrote that even if a different conclusion regarding the purpose of the statute could be ascertained 
by a plain reading of the statute, the lower courts were not so obviously wrong in their decision 
that they should be reversed. 125 
In his dissent, with Chief Justice Rehnquist joining, Justice Scalia accepted the state’s 
stated purpose of “protecting academic freedom” as sincere.  He construed the term “academic 
freedom” to refer to "students' freedom from indoctrination" 126 ; in this case their freedom "to 
decide for themselves how life began, based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific 
evidence." 127  Further, Justice Scalia scrutinized the first portion of the Lemon test, stating "To 
look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not 
exist." 128 
 Justice Scalia’s Italian-American factor in this case is harder to decipher than most.  
However, its possible that Justice Scalia considered the sense of place/comfort in one’s place is 
the motivator here.  Justice Scalia stated that school children are free for themselves to decide how 
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life began. 129   He therefore, wishes to allow children to be comfortable in their decision.  
Moreover, this decision may also point to Justice Scalia’s willingness to keep this type of material 
in the family structure.  It is possible that Justice Scalia’s parents instilled his creationist views in 
him.  This could be an instance of Justice Scalia wanting a strong, family structure to foster 
children’s beliefs. 
E. Gonzales v. Raich 130 
 In 1996, California passed Proposition 215, which legalized the use of medical marijuana. 
131    The Defendant, Angel Raich, used his own homegrown medical marihuana, which was 
acceptable under California law, but was illegal under federal law.  The plants were considered 
Schedule I drugs under the federal Controlled Substance Act. 132   On August 15, 2002, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency and officers of the Butte County Sheriff’s Department destroyed all of co-
defendant Diane Monson’s marijuana plants, even though they determined that her possession was 
entirely legal under California state law. 133  Both Monson and Raich sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief, claiming that enforcing the CSA would violate the Commerce Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 134  
 Both Raich and Monson were treated by physicians, who determined, after prescribing 
numerous prescription medications, that medicinal marijuana would be the only “medicat ion” 
available to alleviate their symptoms.  Both women used marijuana medicinally for years prior to 
their doctors’ recommendations.  Further, evidence suggested that both women heavily relied on 
marijuana to function daily.  In the case of Raich, her physician believed that if Raich stopped 
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using marijuana, the excruciating pain she would suffer from could turn fatal. 135   The District 
Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. 136  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the District Court’s judgment and ordered the preliminary 
injunction, finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a strong likelihood that the CSA exceeded 
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. 137 
 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Breyer, wrote the majority opinion.  The decision was a 6-3 ruling, first pointing out that the 
defendants never disputed that Congress had the power to control the non-medical uses of 
marijuana.  Further, the defendants did not dispute the passage of the CSA as illegal under the 
Commerce Power.  The Court noted that all the defendants argue is that the CSA’s “prohibition of 
the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and 
possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ 
authority under the Commerce Clause.” 138  However, the Court reasoned that based on the rulings 
in Wickard v. Filburn, 139 United States v. Lopez, 140 and United States v. Morrison, 141: 
 …the regulation is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production 
of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a 
substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.  
142 
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Further, the difficulty in distinguishing marijuana that is grown locally or elsewhere led the Court  
to have no difficulty in believing that Congress had a rational basis for believing that intrastate 
possession of marijuana would leave a hole in the CSA. 143 
 Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in this case in an effort to differentiate the 
decision from those in Lopez and Morrison.  Although Justice Scalia voted in favor of limiting the 
Commerce Clause in the previous cases, he felt that his reading of the Necessary and Property 
Clause forced him to vote for the expansion of the Commerce Clause in this case: 
Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate 
commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an 
interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the 
interstate regulation effective. As Lopez itself states, and the Court affirms today, 
Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to 
do so ‘could … undercut’ its regulation of interstate commerce. ... This is not a 
power that threatens to obliterate the line between ‘what is truly national and what 
is truly local.’ 144 
 
Further, Justice Scalia pointed out that both Lopez and Morrison did not declare that noneconomic 
intrastate activities were beyond the scope of the Federal Government’s regulation. 145  Finally, 
Justice Scalia states that Congress’ ability to enact prohibitions of intrastate controlled substance 
activities depend only upon whether the regulations are an appropriate means of achieving the 
legitimate ends of eradicating “Schedule I” substance from interstate commerce. 146  
 Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented, 
expressing that the majority decision allowed an application of the CSA that destroyed California’s 
position without any proof that the medicinal possession and use of marijuana had a substantia l 
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effect on interstate commerce. 147  Further, in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the Court essentially 
promulgated a rule that gave Congress an incentive to legislate broadly under the Commerce 
Clause. 148   Accordingly, Justice O’Connor wrote that the position the majority allowed was 
irreconcilable with the prior Supreme Court decisions. 149 
 Justice Thomas also dissented, stating that the local cultivation and consumption of 
medicinal marijuana by the two patients was not commerce amongst the states. 150  Further, Justice 
Thomas held that the CSA as applied in the case was not necessary and proper in upholding 
Congress’ restrictions on interstate drug trade. 151  Therefore, according to Justice Thomas, neither 
the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to regulate 
the conduct at issue. 152 
 Justice Scalia’s opinion in this case could be derived from his need for a strict sense of 
rules.  Here, Justice Scalia read the Necessary and Proper Cause in a narrow fashion, holding that 
“Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so ‘could 
… undercut’ its regulation of interstate commerce.” 153  In a narrow reading of this clause, Justice 
Scalia is exhibiting his desire for a strict set of rules with limited exception.  Possibly, if Justice 
Scalia had a different upbringing rather than the traditional Italian-American family he grew up 
in, he would be more open to exceptions or a broader reading of Constitutional provisions. 
 
F. Michael H. v. Gerald D.154 
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 In 1981, Gerald D. was listed as the father on the birth certificate of Victoria D. 155 Victoria 
D.’s mother, Carole D., believed, however, that the real father of Victoria D. was Michael H., a 
man with whom she had been having an affair.  A paternity test revealed a substantial likelihood 
that Michael H. was indeed the father of Victoria D. 156  Michael H. thereafter filed an action in 
California to attain visitation rights and to be established as Victoria D.’s father. 157  Gerald D., 
however, petitioned for summary judgment under California Evidence Code § 621, which states 
“the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusive ly 
presumed to be a child of the marriage.” 158  The California Supreme Court agreed with Gerald D., 
but Michael H. was granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.  Michael H. claimed 
that § 621 violated substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 159 
 In writing the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy, opined that § 621 did not violate due process rights and therefore 
Michael H. could not rebut California’s evidentiary presumption that Gerald D. was Victoria’s 
father.  Justice Scalia was open with his disgust of the facts of the case with comments such as 
“[t]he facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary” 160  and “California law, like nature 
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.” 161  To establish the scope of the Due Process 
Clause, Justice Scalia wrote that the interest in limitation must be so fundamental that it is an 
interest that is traditionally protected by society. 162  The tradition that was to be rebutted in this 
case, is the traditional marital family structure and the presumption of legitimacy of children that 
                                                 
155 Id. at 113 
156 Id. at 114 
157 Id. 
158 Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (Deering 1986) 
159 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116 
160 Id. at 113 
161 Id. at 118 
162 Id. at 122 
 29 
was rooted in common law. 163   Therefore, Michael H. had to prove that society afforded natural 
fathers parental rights; or at least, society did not outright deny them when there is a child born 
into a traditional family.  The Court found that the states did not award substantive parental rights 
to the natural father where a child was born into an existing family. 164  Ultimately, Justice Scalia 
found “to provide protection to an adulterous father is to deny protection to a marital father, and 
vice versa.” 165 
 Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred with Justice Scalia’s plurality 
opinion, except that none of the modes of historical analysis expressed by the plurality should be 
imposed when analyzing due process liberty interests. 166 
 Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment.  According to Justice Stevens, the statute 
at issue did not violate due process since it prevented the putative father from obtaining the 
judiciary’s determination of the paternity. 167  Further, Justice Stevens opined that the possibility 
of a constitutionally protected relationship between a natural father and child should not be 
foreclosed in light of the decision in this case. 168   Finally, in assuming the putative father’s 
relationship with the adolescent was strong enough to allow a constitutional right for visitat ion, 
California’s legislative scheme was consistent with due process. 169 
 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun, dissented, expressing 
that natural father’s link to his child, combined with a parent-child relationship between them, 
guarantees the natural father an interest in his relationship with his child. 170   Further, Justice 
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Brennan found that the statute at issue prevented the putative father from establishing his paternity, 
but also prevented him from obtaining visitation rights. 171   This system, according to Justice 
Brennan, breeds a flaw that procedural due process is designed to correct. 172 
 Justice White also dissented, opining that an unwed father who has demonstrated a 
commitment to his paternity through personal, financial or custodial responsibilities, has a 
protected interest in a relationship with the child. 173  In the immediate instance, Justice White 
found that the putative father did have such an interest and that the statute violated his due process 
rights because the putative father was denied any meaningful opportunity to establish his paternity.  
174 
 This case is, arguably, Justice Scalia’s most obvious and outspoken view on how a family 
should operate and be structured.  First, Justice Scalia found that Michael H. was looking to: 
embrace[s] the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, 
including the child's care; the right to the child's services and earnings; the right to 
direct the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control, 
education, and health of the child; and the right, as well as the duty, to prepare the 
child for additional obligations, which includes the teaching of moral standards, 
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.175  
 
Further, Justice Scalia found that if the concept of family that Michael H was trying to establish 
was accepted, “…it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships…” 176 Justice 
Scalia also mocked the dissent’s idea that Michael H. had a “freedom not to conform,” by stating 
“[o]ne of them will pay a price for asserting that ‘freedom’—Michael by being unable to act as a 
father of the child he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by being unable to preserve the integr ity 
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of the traditional family unit he and victoria have established.” 177   These theories clearly fall 
within the traditional Italian-American ideals of the sanctity of the family structure cited in Part II. 
 G. Cruz v. New York 178 
 Jerry Cruz was murdered in March of 1982.  The day after Jerry Cruz was murdered, the 
police spoke to Jerry Cruz’s brother, Norberto Cruz, about the murder.  While Norberto Cruz knew 
nothing of his brother’s murder, Norberto Cruz told the police that one-year prior, Eulogio Cruz 
and Benjamin Cruz visited Jerry Cruz and Norberto Cruz (Eulogio and Benjamin were brothers, 
however, the pair bore no familial relation with Jerry and Norberto).  Norberto Cruz told police 
that during this visit, Eulogio Cruz wore a bloodstained bandage around his arm.  Further, Norberto 
Cruz told police that Eulogio Cruz stated that he and Benjamin Cruz had intended to rob a gas 
station in the Bronx, the attendant struggled and shot Eulogio Cruz in the arm.  Benjamin Cruz 
then shot the attendant, killing him. 179 
 The police found Benjamin Cruz and questioned him about the murder of Jerry Cruz.  He 
denied being involved in that crime and became increasingly frustrated when the police seemed to 
be unwilling to believe him.  In an apparent effort to prove he would admit to an act he was guilty 
of, Benjamin Cruz confessed to the murder of the gas station attendant.  After an Assistant Distric t 
Attorney was brought to the police station, Benjamin Cruz gave a detailed videotape confession, 
during which he admitted that he, Eulogio Cruz, Jerry Cruz and a fourth man had robbed the 
station. 180 
 A grand jury indicted Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz for felony murder.  The brothers were 
tried jointly.  Euologio objected to the use of Jerry’s videotaped confession, however it was 
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admitted with a limiting instruction that it could only be used against Jerry.  The jury found both 
men guilty and Euologio was subject to a sentence of fifteen years to life.  Euologio appealed, but 
the appellate division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. 181 
 In writing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, 
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens, discussed Bruton v. United States 182  in analyzing the 
question presented.  In Bruton, the Court held that a defendant is deprived of rights under the 
Confrontation Clause if a confession by his codefendant is introduced at the joint trial.  Moreover, 
the Court held that it was of no significance if the jury received a limiting instruction to consider 
it only in the confessor’s case. 183   Justice Scalia then moved on to discuss how the Confrontation 
Clause works.  This clause guarantees that defendants can confront the witnesses that testify 
against them.  This guarantee includes the right to cross-examine witnesses.  In a joint trial, Scalia 
stated, the confession of one defendant is not admissible against the codefendant unless the 
confessing defendant waives his rights under the Fifth Amendment in order to submit to cross-
examination. 184    In Burton, the Court determined that limiting instructions to the jury were 
insufficient in this regard.  The Court was split on a subsequent case where both defendants made 
confessions.  In his concurrence in Parker v. Randolph, Justice Blackman proffered that the 
introduction of corroborating confessions could cause a harmless violation of the Confrontat ion 
Clause, however, there could be other cases in which the violation would be much more 
detrimental. 185 
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 In the immediate case, the Court adopted Justice Blackmun’s view from Parker, finding 
that there were plenty of statements that could cause a corroborating statement to be “devastating. ”  
The Court then argues that Cruz’s confession was open to question because it depended on the 
acceptance of Norberto’s testimony. 186   Further, the Court discovered an inverse relationship 
when two confessions “interlock”: 
A codefendant's confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it 
tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but 
enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant's 
alleged confession. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his 
confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant's confession does no 
more than support the defendant's very own case. But in the real world of crimina l 
litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession—on the ground that it 
was not accurately reported, or that it was not really true when made. 187 
 
 In conclusion, Justice Scalia and the majority held that the Confrontation Clause bars the 
admission, in joint trials, of non-testifying codefendants’ confessions incriminating the defendant, 
even if the defendant’s own confession is admitted.  If the codefendant is unavailable, Justice 
Scalia found that a defendant’s confession could be considered to assess whether a codefendant’s 
statements are supported by an “indicia of reliability” to be admissible against him, despite the 
lack of opportunity for cross-examination. 188 
 Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor, 
dissented, stating that the Bruton rule should not be extended to a case where a defendant’s 
confession “interlocked” with a codefendant’s confession. 189  In this matter, the codefendant’s 
confession was essentially the same as the other defendant’s confession and therefore could not 
incriminate either defendant any more then their own respective confessions. 190 
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 In finding that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of non-testifying codefendants’ 
confessions incriminating the defendant in joint-trials, Justice Scalia could be applying a 
straightforward application of the law.  Straightforwardness, as stated in Part II, is a feature of 
Italian-American culture.  In a plain reading of the Confrontation Clause, the defendant has the 
right to face his accuser and subject him/her to cross-examination.  It naturally follows that if a 
codefendant does not testify at trial, there is no opportunity to cross-examine the accuser.  It is a 
simple, basic approach to reading the law.  Similarly, this reading could allude to a strict adherence 
to code common amongst Italian-Americans.  Here, Justice Scalia read the law and interpreted it 
for its basic meaning.   Justice Scalia was unwilling to find an exception where one could be drawn.  
 H. Florida v. Jaridines 191 
 In November of 2006, an anonymous tip was given to Miami Police that the Defendant’s 
home was being used as a marijuana grow home.  Approximately one month later, a few detectives 
and a trained drug-sniffing canine approached the home, while other officers and the DEA 
established a perimeter around the home.  An officer accompanied the dog up to the front door of 
the defendant’s home and the dog alerted the officer of contraband.  After being informed of the 
dog’s findings, a detective approached the home and smelled the scent of marijuana.  The detective 
then prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant.  A search was conducted after the 
warrant was granted and marijuana was found in the home. 192 
 The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.  However, the 
decision was reversed in the Florida Third District Court of Appeal.    The Florida Supreme Court 
found for the defendant and denied the state a motion for rehearing. 193  When the Supreme Court 
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granted certiorari, the scope was limited to the question of “whether the officers’ behavior was a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 194 
 The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas, Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan.  In the Supreme Court’s prior “dog sniff cases”, 
the Court took a liberal approach to determining what did and did not constitute a search. 195  In a 
5-4 decision, the court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and held that the 
government’s use of dogs to investigate the home and immediate surroundings is a search.  The 
case was not divided along ideological lines; instead, the conservative justices were evenly split, 
featuring Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined three of the four liberal justices in the major ity.  
Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy joined the minority in the dissent. 196 
 Justice Scalia, in writing the majority, did not focus on the right to privacy, which is 
generally analyzed in the modern day Fourth Amendment cases and relied upon by the concurring 
justices in this case. 197  Instead, Justice Scalia focused on citizen’s property rights, returning to 
the Court’s early jurisprudence.  The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment’s core is comprised 
of "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion." 198   Justice Scalia cited precedent as early as 1765, tying the courts 
decision to common law trespass. 199  Further, Justice Scalia stated: 
We therefore regard the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the 
home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth 
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Amendment purposes.’... That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the 
distinction between the home and the open fields is ‘as old as the common law,’... 
so too is the identity of home and what Blackstone called the ‘curtilage or 
homestall,’ for the ‘house protects and privileges all its branches and 
appurtenants.’... This area around the home is ‘intimately linked to the home, both 
physically and psychologically,’ and is where ‘privacy expectations are most 
heightened.’ 200 
 
Moreover, the Court stated that a doorbell or doorknocker is an invitation to the public to approach 
the home for various activities, such as to “trick-or-treat” or solicit for donations. 201   This 
invitation extends to the police where they have the right to ask residents for information. 202  The 
Court found, however, that this implicit license does not extend to activities such as a “vis itor 
exploring the front path with a metal detector” 203 or allowing police officers to “peer into the 
house through binoculars with impunity” 204 , and would constitute a common law trespass.  
Therefore, the Court found that bringing a police dog into a home’s curtilage to search for 
incriminating evidence was an unreasonable search without a warrant. 205 
 Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, wrote a concurring 
opinion.  Justice Kagan took the position that both property and privacy rights are implicated in a 
case such as this, stating: 
A stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying super-high-powered 
binoculars. He doesn't knock or say hello. Instead, he stands on the porch and uses 
the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home's furthest corners. It 
doesn’t take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a couple of minutes, 
his uncommon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you disclose to no 
one. Has your "visitor" trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have 
granted to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute campaign 
flyers? Yes, he has. And has he also invaded your "reasonable expectation of 
privacy" by nosing into intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure ? 
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 380 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Yes, of 
course, he has done that too.  
 
That case is this case in every way that matters. 206 
 
Justice Kagan further concluded that it does not matter whether the detection is a device or a dog; 
when the device is not in general public use and is used to search a home, it violates a citizen’s 
“minimal expectation of privacy.” 207 
 Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, stated 
that the majority’s opinion is "based on a putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found 
in the annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence." 208  Justice Alito instead proffered that under the 
traditional law of trespassing, visitors are not trespassing if they "approach the door, pause long 
enough to see if someone is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay longer), leave ... a visitor 
who adheres to these limitations is not necessarily required to ring the doorbell, knock on the door, 
or attempt to speak with an occupant." 209 
 In this case, Justice Scalia reverted back to citizen’s property rights, as opposed to the 
reasonable expectation of privacy the courts had implemented for many years.  That may be so 
because traditional Italian-Americans have a sense of place or comfort in their home or 
surroundings.  This factor could include a sense in one’s home and surrounding area.  In that case, 
Justice Scalia’s holding that bringing a police dog into a home’s curtilage to search for evidence 
without a warrant rises to a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search consistent with traditiona l 
Italian-American beliefs.   
 I. United States v. Jones 210 
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 Antoine Jones owned a nightclub in the Washington D.C. area, which was managed by 
Lawrence Maynard.  In 2004, the FBI and DC Police Department began an investigation into the 
two individuals for possession and distribution of narcotics.  Without a warrant, a global 
positioning system (GPS) was placed on Jones’ vehicle.  The GPS tracked Jones movement for 
twenty-four hors a day over the course of four weeks.  In late 2005, Jones was arrested and his 
attorney immediately filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the GPS.  In late 2006, 
a federal jury deadlocked on conspiracy charges and acquitted Jones on various other charges.  
Jones was retried in 2007 and the jury found him guilty on conspiracy charges and possession.211  
The charges were significant enough for Jones to be sentenced to life in prison. 212  In 2010, the 
DC Appeals Court overturned the conviction, holding that the installation of the GPS was a search 
because it violated Jones’ “reasonable expectation of privacy.”   In 2011, the Supreme Court grand 
certiorari. 213 
 Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor.  The Court held that the “Government’s 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements, constitutes a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment.” 214  In authoring the majority 
opinion, Justice Scalia cited cases as far back as 1886 215, arguing that a physical intrusion into a 
protected area was the basis for determining whether a search occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Scalia ceded that the majority of search and seizure cases since 1967 had shifted 
toward the “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach 216, however, Scalia pointed to a few 
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decisions post-1967 to argue that the “trespass” approach had not been completely abandoned. 217  
Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that at a minimum, the Fourth Amendment must provide the same 
level of protection as it was intended when the Amendment was adopted. 218   Further, Scalia 
emphasized that the “trespass” approach does not necessarily exclude the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” approach, since the “reasonable expectation” test is appropriate for situations where 
there is a transmission of electronic signals without a trespass. 219 
 In the matter before the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that since the Government’s GPS 
was a trespass for the sole purpose of obtaining information, it constituted a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Since the Court determined the GPS installation was considered a search,  
Justice Scalia refused to recognize any exceptions that would make the search reasonable, since 
the Government failed to submit an alternate theory in the lower courts. 220  The Court also left 
unanswered a broader question regarding the privacy implication of warrantless GPS installa t ion 
absent a physical intrusion: “It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case 
does not require us to answer that question.” 221 
 In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor disputed the constitutionality of warrantless 
GPS surveillance in the short as well as the long-term.  Even during short-term GPS surveillance, 
Justice Sotomayor, the GPS can record every movement of the subject and thus, private 
destinations. 222  Further, Justice Sotomayor opined: 
 People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular 
providers, the URLS that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
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correspond to their Internet service providers, and the books, groceries and 
medications they purchase to online retailers . . . I would not assume that all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 223 
 
 Justice Alito also concurred, with Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan 
joining.  According to Justice Alito, common-law property-based analysis of searches does not 
apply to electronic searches at issue in the immediate case. 224  Further, Justice Alito argued that 
society’s expectation is that complete and long-term surveillance would not be undertaken. 225 
Justice Scalia’s adherence to a set of rules can be seen throughout this opinion.  
Specifically, Justice Scalia focuses on a substantial number of historical decisions.  Further, in 
analyzing the case, Justice Scalia points to decisions that hold the opposite of the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test that had dominated the privacy cases since 1967.  Justice Scalia 
focuses on this historical approach because of his adherence to a code.  Justice Scalia refused to 
deter from his belief and approach in a showing of independence from the prevalent view at the 
time of the opinion.   
 J. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 226 
 In 2005, the California Legislature passed AB 1179, which banned the sale of “violent” 
video games to anyone under the age of eighteen (18). 227   Further, the act required that there be 
a clear labeling of the game being violent, beyond the already mandatory ESRB rating system. 228  
The law required a maximum $1,000 fine for each infraction of the Act. 229  “Violent video games” 
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were defined by a variation of the Miller test used by the US Supreme Court to determine when 
speech was not protected under the First Amendment. 230  The bill was signed into law by Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger in October of 2005 231  and was set to go into effect in January of 2006. 
232 
Before the law went into effect, the Entertainment Merchants Association prepared a 
lawsuit to overturn the act, fearing that the “violent video game” definition would effect games 
that the ESRB system deemed suitable for children and that the law would ultimately harm the 
video game industry as a whole. 233  The Plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction in late 
2005 by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.  In 2007, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled for the Plaintiffs in 2007, holding 
(1) that the law violated the First Amendment and (2) that there was an insufficient showing of 
proof that video games caused violent behavior. 234 
 Governor Schwarzenegger appealed the District Court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  Governor Schwarzenegger filed a writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in 2009. 235  On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court 
struck down the California law as unconstitutional on the basis of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  First, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, Justice 
Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, held that video games should be afforded First Amendment 
Protection: 
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Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games 
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary 
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features 
distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). 
That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. 236 
 
Justice Scalia further noted that although states may pass laws to block obscene materials from 
being distributed to minors, “…speech about violence is not obscene.” 237  Justice Scalia went on 
to write that some violent video games are analogous to fairy tales and that even if videogames 
were without value to society, “…they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the 
best of literature.” 238  
 Justice Scalia also held that the industry standard ESRB rating system was operating 
effectively to regulate the sales of violent video games to minors and the “filling the remaining 
modest gap in concerned-parents’ control can hardly be a compelling state interest.” 239  Further, 
the Court determined by the evidence presented, there were no compelling links between violent 
video games and violent acts of minors. 240  In fact, Justice Scalia cited a medical report that 
proffered cartoons like Looney Tunes generate the same effect in children as in games like Sonic 
the Hedgehog or imagery of guns. 241 
 Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts.  Although Justice 
Alito agreed that California’s threshold requirement that guided what material would be covered 
was too broad, he felt that there was a potential double standard formed between violent and sexual 
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content regarding the threshold. 242  Further, Justice Alito questioned the idea that violent video 
games did not have an effect on children. 243 
 Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the Founding Fathers “believed parents to have 
complete authority over their minor children and expected parents to direct the development of 
those children.” 244  Moreover, Justice Thomas opined that the intent of the First Amendment "does 
not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through 
the minors' parents or guardians." 245 
 Justice Breyer also dissented in this case.  Justice Breyer likened the sale of violent video 
games to minors to the sale of pornographic magazines to minors: “But what sense does it make 
to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting 
a sale to that 13- year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, binds 
and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her?” 246  Moreover, Justice Breyer expressed concern 
that the self-regulated video game industry still allowed twenty (20) to fifty (50) percent of minors 
to purchase violent video games. 247 
 As stated above, the parents dominate the traditional structure of Italian-American 
households.  It flows naturally, then, that the children are submissive to their parents’ demands.  
In this case, Justice Scalia felt that the concerned parent’s interest in the video games their children 
play was not a compelling state interest. 248  In this way, Justice Scalia was unwilling to take 
control of the parents’ control/household and put it in the power of the state.  Justice Scalia found 
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that this interest of the parents’ was more appropriate in the parents’ home, thereby conforming to 
the typical Italian-American mentality of keeping control in the father and mother’s hands. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Traditional Italian-American values can be seen in many of Justice Scalia’s opinions.  
Some are obvious; some are more discreet.  However, it is clear that orginalism, in part, is related 
to the tendency that Italian-Americans follow their sense of a code.  As can be seen throughout 
this paper, Justice Scalia rarely opines on exceptions to long-standing rules of law.  Moreover, 
Justice Scalia often cites to and follows long-standing rules of law, much like most Italian-
American stick to their “code”, whether legal or not.  Justice Scalia’s originalism can certainly be 
perceived as a product of his Italian-American upbringing and heritage. 
 Further, in the analyzed opinions where Justice Scalia did not allude to a sense of code or 
adherence to tradition, a theme of strong family values can be derived from his writings.  Justice 
Scalia can be seen deciding in favor of situations that uphold the structure of the family or preserve 
“family values”.  Although not directly attributable to originalism, preserving a strong structure 
and system can be compared to the concept of originalism that the Constitution is to be interpreted 
as written.  The Constitution is to be preserved and upheld as an institution; much like an Italian-
American family. 
 So long as Justice Scalia sits on the bench, he will always write his opinions and vote in 
connection with orginalism.  Through those beliefs, Justice Scalia alludes to his adherence to a 
code and his connection with family, which are prevalent features of Italian-American culture.  It 
is reasonable to expect these themes will permeate through Justice Scalia’s writing in the future.  
Further, Justice Scalia is a living embodiment of rispetto; he publically states his opinion and 
thereafter adopts a set of obligations to his code and sense of family. 
